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Abstract
With widespread use of the Internet, there is an increase 20 28.3.1.2
in concern over users' privacy. In particular, an adversary
may identify the receiver involved in a communication ses-
sion by observing the packet traffic. We propose a new rout-
ing mechanism, which we call packet cloaking, to protect
127.8.3.2
the privacy of a receiver The main idea ofpacket cloaking 27832 2035Internet
is to transmit multiple copies of a sent packet to a selected
group of k receivers, so that an adversary may only identify Router
the true receiver with a probability of k. We present the sys-
tem design to supportpacket cloaking. We also propose two
metrics that measure the receiver privacy, based on evalu- Sender
ating the similarity between the sender/receiver traffic pat- 127 832
terns. We have performed experimental evaluations to ver-
127.8.3.3 Tuify the effectiveness of our approach. Re
Recipient
Figure 1. Packet Cloaking.
1 Introduction
The Internet is a prominent platform for wide area net-
work communication. Numerous applications such as web- tion. Specifically, given a sender and its intended recipient,
browsers, emails, and messaging software are being widely a trusted entity called a cloaking agent finds k - 1 other
used. These applications are highly useful, but also pose hosts in addition to the true recipient. The cloaking agent
important privacy concerns for their users. For example, a then sends each packet from the sender to these k recipi-
user surfing the net may not want to reveal the websites be- ents. Figure 1 shows a sender trying to send a packet to the
ing visited. Unfortunately, user activities in the open Inter- receiver (circled in the figure) at IP address 127.8.3.2. The
net may be easily traced by eavesdroppers. For example, if sender first sends the packet to the cloaking agent, specify-
it is observed that a user A is sending a sustained stream of ing k to be 4. The cloaking agent accordingly generates four
data packets to another user B, over an extended period of identical copies of the packet and sends them to the four re-
time, then it is likely that A and B are engaged in a conver- ceivers shown. Since the same packet is being sent to the
sation with each other. It is therefore important to provide four destinations at the same time, it is more difficult for an
privacy while packets are being routed between users. adversary to trace the packet to the true receiver. Moreover,
In this paper, we develop a routing mechanism to help if the four receivers are geographically far apart, it will be
avoid the receiver of a one-way communication from be- harder to localize the true receiver. Thus, it is possible to
ing identified through traffic observation. The mechanism, protect both the identify and the location of the receiver.
which we call packet cloaking, assumes that the network has We now describe a system architecture to realize packet
excessive capacity, and introduces an amount of confound- cloaking. The system encrypts the contents of a packet with
ing traffic to increase the difficulty of tracing a communica- a key known only to the packet's true receiver, thus pro-
viding content privacy [8] against unauthorized access. In the packet will be transmitted, by a probabilistic decision,
selecting the receivers of a packet other than the true re- to the intended final destination. Further to [2, 11, 4, 12],
ceiver, the cloaking agent will limit the candidate receivers we quantify the impact of the pattern of network traffic on
to only those nodes that have agreed to participate in the the privacy provided, using time-series analysis combined
cloaking system. To quantify the system's ability to pro- with k-anonymity. Recently, receiver location privacy us-
vide privacy, we will investigate two new metrics based on ing replicated packet transmissions is studied in [14], for
k-anonymity [13] and time-series analysis [9, 15]. These the case of a wireless sensor network. The relationship be-
metrics measure the linkability of the receiver with a given tween privacy and the characterization of network traffic is
sender, and account for the receiver's privacy in terms of also not discussed in [14].
how easy the receiver's location (e.g., its subnet) can be
identified. Additionally, we report ns-2 [6] simulation re- 3 Packet Cloaking
sults to illustrate the cost of packet cloaking and its re-
silience to traffic analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec- In this paper, we assume a one-way communication be-
tion 2, we review related work. In Section 3, we describe tween a sender and a receiver. The cloaking agent, being
the detailed steps of packet cloaking. Section 4 develops a central component in our privacy system, is used to gen-
two metrics for quantifying privacy. Experimental results erate packet traffics for the sender. In particular, for each
are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude the communication request by a sender, the cloaking agent cre-
paper. ates connections to k different recipients, one of which is
the true recipient. Let us discuss this in more detail.
2 Related Work Before any transmission begins, a user needs to register
with the cloaking agent for authorization to use the cloak-
ing facilities. The user may also inform the cloaking agent
Information privacy has been a subject of active research about the conditions that it is willing to receive a cloaking
in recent years. The foundation work in [10] presents defini- packet. For example, a user may only want to help with
tions of terms related to privacy. We use the term "linkabil- packet cloaking when he is not using the computer, or if he
ity" to refer to the ability of identifying the receiver-sender is a good friend of the true recipient. These pieces of infor-
pair engaged in a communication. In [13], the notion of mation are stored in the database of the cloaking agent. The
k-anonymity is defined, when the value of a data attribute agent then provides its public key to the new user. The user
is indistinguishable from k - 1 other values. Our method, could also give his/her public key to the agent if he has not
which hides the true receiver among k receivers of the same done so.
packet, can be regarded as providing k-anonymity in packet After registration, the sender may now send packets
routing. Recent work has also applied k-anonymity to pro- through the cloaking agent. Suppose that a sender, say S,
vide location privacy [7, 3], where the location of a user can wishes to send a packet to another user, say R. We assume
only be resolved to a region consisting of k - 1 other users. that S has already signed the packet with its private key. The
We similarly investigate the location privacy of the true re- routing process comprises four steps (circled in Figure 2),
ceiver, relative to the locations of other possible receivers. as described below:
(For example, whether the possible receivers are all in the
same subnet.) Our work additionally investigates how the 1. S encrypts the packet to be sent, using the public key
patterns of network traffic will impact on the privacy be- provided by the cloaking agent, and signs the packet.
ing provided. To that end, we introduce a new metric that The encryption and signature prevent the packet's con-
combines both k-anonymity and time-series analysis. tents from being read or modified while it is being sent
We now summarize techniques for providing network to the cloaking agent. The packet is decrypted by the
privacy, which prevent packets from being traced in the agent, and S's signature is verified. The cloaking agent
network. In [2], an anonymous email system is proposed. then produces a list of k IP addresses, which it uses as
The email system hides the identity of the receiver by intro- the destinations of the sender's packet.
ducing a number of "mix" nodes in the routing path. Mix
nodes are machines that accept emails encrypted with their 2. To obtain the k receivers, the cloaking agent consults
public keys, decrypt them, and send them to the next mix. its database. The database can be queried for a set of
The concept is further extended in onion routing [11, 4], IP addresses corresponding to the nodes that are will-
where a packet is encrypted a number of times during the ing to receive a cloaking packet from S. The cloaking
transmission. In [12], the notion of a crowd is proposed, agent randomly selects k - 1 nodes from the set of
in which a packet is routed through a number of random candidates, in addition to the true receiver R. We call
participating routers whose purpose is to confound, before a receiver other than the true one a cloaking receiver.
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Figure 2. System Architecture for Packet Cloaking.
Notice that it may not be possible to find k - 1 cloak- same site. The use of more than one packet transmitter
ing receivers. If this happens, the cloaking agent may can help to distribute the load of generating packets, and
ask the sender to use a smaller value of k. Also, this also avoid the packet copies from overloading the cloaking
selection process only needs to be done once when S agent's link to the Internet.
creates a connection with R; afterwards, the same list
will be used throughout the connection. 4 Correlation-based Privacy Metrics
3. The cloaking agent sends a packet to each of the k se-
lected receivers. It first uses R's public key to encrypt To measure the effectiveness of packet cloaking against
the signed packet. Then, the packet transmitter of the trafic analysis, we present two metrics quantiying the cor-
cloaking agent produces k copies of the signed and en- relation between two traffic patterns. The first metric quan-
crypted packet, and send a packet to each of the re- tifies the linkability of a given sender with the true receiver,
c*eivers while the second one measures the location privacy of theeivers.
receiver in terms of the probability that the receiver can be
4. Upon receiving a packet sent by the cloaking agent, localized to its subnet.
each of the k receivers attempts to decrypt the received Correlation Let A = {ai =1, 2, .. ., n} and
packet. Since the packet is encrypted with R's public B = {bj i =1, 2, ... , n} be two real-number sequences
key, only R (who knows its own private key) can suc- of length n. Let A Z, j and B = i=l bi be the
cessfully read the packet. Each of the k - 1 cloaking respective means of A and B. Then the correlation coeffi-
receivers will discard the packet when it fails to de- cient between A and B, denoted by c(A, B), is defined as
crypt the packet. follows [9, 15]:
In the process described above, the encryp- n
tion/decryption are merely used to protect the content c(A, B)= A)(b- B) (1)
privacy [8] of the sender, and does not affect the effective- j(Z=i(ai - A)2)(En 1(bi - B)2)
ness of protecting the receiver's location privacy - i.e., the
contextual privacy [8] - against traffic analysis. Notice Equation 1 is a common way of comparing the similarity
also that the sender's privacy may be better protected by between two real-valued sequences. Note that c(A, B) C
not revealing its IP address in the packets being sent to the [0, 1], where a higher value of c(A, B) indicates a higher
cloaking receivers, since these packets will be discarded degree of similarity between A and B.
anyway. Suppose an observer is able to monitor the traffic in the
Another issue is that although only one packet transmit- whole network for an extensive period of time. We measure
ter is shown in Figure 2, it is possible to have more than the time in terms of time slots of equal length. Let the traffic
one packet transmitter, which may not be necessarily in the observed at the output port of a sender for a fixed number m
of time slots be given by a real-valued sequence S = {si} (7,8,9,10)
where si is the number of packets seen at time slot i. Let R (0,1,2)
(with j 1, 2,... , N) denote the jth node in a network of
N nodes. Assume that the traffic observed at the input port T,
of a node Rj for m time slots is given by the set {rj }, where Litical
r, is the number of packets observed on Rat tme slot
i. If H(j,t) r{i±t},where t C Z+, then c(S,H(j,t)) T T
measures the similarity of the traffic pattern between the
sender and the receiver Ri, right-shifted by some number t T6
of time slots. The right shift is necessary because packets T2 (11,12,13,14,15)
transmitted by the sender may experience a network delay (16,17) T7 Receiver
before arriving at Rj. By considering this delay, the true
correlation between the traffic patterns of the sender and Figure 3. Network Topology for Experiments.
the receiver can be measured. We now define two metrics
based on correlation.
4.1 Sender-Receiver Linkability 3R X/{S}c(S,H(i t))
Let the true receiver be Rr. Assume that the cloaking ERiPEY/t cS, H(i, t))
agent, on behalf of the sender, chooses a set K of k re- In Equation 4, the numerator represents the sum of cor-
ceivers, including Rr. We now define Pr (t) as follows: relation values between S and each receiver residing in the
same subnet as Rr. The denominator is the sum of corre-
Pr (t) c(S, H(r, t)) (2) lation values for all the hosts in the network other than the
ZER,K c(S, H(m, t)) sender. Intuitively, Pg(t) is the probability that traffic pat-
Essentially, P. (t) is the probability that R.is identified terns similar to the outgoing traffic from S can be observed
through correlation with the sender's traffic, using a time in the same subnet of Rr. If Pg is high, a large volume of
delay t. Recall that in packet cloaking, the sender chooses traffic similar to that received by Rr appears in Rr's sub-
k receivers each of which is potentially the true receiver. net. If the IP address of the subnet can be associated with
Hence, in the best case, the true receiver will be identified a physical location, then the observer can closely estimate
with a probability of. . However, if the observer can moni- Rr's location, even if the address of Rr is not known. Thus,
tor the network for an extended period of time, the observer Pg measures the probability that the receiver's location in ator he ntworfo n e ev
subnet iS revealed.
may be able to discover Rr by observing that the degree s e is revealed.
of traffic correlation between S and Rr is higher than that We now define the receiver's location privacy, denoted
between S and any other receiver in K. Thus, Equation 2 by Eg(t), as follows:
captures the effectiveness of traffic observation in relating a Eg (t)
= -
Pg (t) (5)
sender with its receiver.
We can now define the sender-receiver linkability, de- where Eg, ranging from 0 to 1, measures the location pri-
noted by El (t), as follows: vacy of a true receiver. A larger value of Eg represents a
better protection for the receiver's location privacy.
El(t) = - Pr(t) (3)
where El, ranging from 0 to 1, measures the linkability of 5 Experimental Results
the sender and its receiver. For example, if Pr is small,
Rr has a lower probability of being identified as the true We have performed experiments to evaluate the proposed
receiver. Correspondingly, El will be large. method of packet cloaking. We first describe the simulation
setup. Then, we describe the detailed results.
4.2 Receiver's Location Privacy
5.1 Experimental Setup
The second metric evaluates the probability that the true
receiver can be localized to its subnet. Let Y be the set of We use BRITE [1] to generate the topology shown in
all hosts in the network. Further, let X be the set of hosts in Figure 3. There are seven routers (T1, T2,. . ., T7) and 18
the minimal subnet that includes the true receiver Rr. We hosts (indicated by the IDs shown under each router). Hosts
now define Pg (t) as follows: that are connected to the same router form a subnet. For
instance, R16 and R17 belong to the same subnet as they decreases (Equation 2), causing a drop in the value of El
are connected to T7. We have identified the link between (Equation 3). This shows that the sender-receiver privacy
routers R3 and R4 as the critical link, in the sense that most can be improved with a larger number of participants in
packets are routed through this link. The simulations are the packet cloaking. In the same figure, we also compare
done in ns-2 using the generated topology. The bandwidth our protocol's performance with an "ideal" graph, obtained
of each link between the routers is 100 Mb/s and the link's by assuming that there is no other traffic except that gener-
propagation delay is 30 ms. The bandwidth of a link be- ated by the cloaking agent. Thus, all the participants in the
tween a router and a host is 10 Mb/s and the propagation cloaking system will have the same traffic correlation value
delay is 3 ms. with the sender, and the true receiver is always identified
with a probability of Pr = . In this case, El becomes0.95k0.95 1kor kkl. The performance of our protocol, consid-
0.9 ering the similarity between the sender and receiver traffic,
0.85 is close to this curve. The small difference is due to the
0.8 Experiment presence of the cross traffic used in the experiments.
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Figure 4. El vs. k. 0.1
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We use host Ro as the sender, and use host R12 as the k
intended receiver of Ro's packets. We assume that all the
hosts are willing to participate in packet cloaking, so that Figure 5. Eg vs. k.
the cloaking agent can choose among all the hosts in the
generated topology as the cloaking receivers. Each packet
has a size of 1,500 bytes, and is sent using UDP. By de-
fault, packets are generated using a Poisson process at an 5.2.2 Location Privacy of the True Receiver
average rate of 2 Mb/s. We also use nine other active con-
nections to simulate the background traffic in the Internet. Next, we investigate how the receiver's location privacy,
To measure the correlation between the sender's traffic and measured in terms of Eg, is affected by changing the num-
the receiver's traffic to obtain the privacy measure in Equa- ber of participants, k. Figure 5 shows the results over a
tion 3, we use the delay of the first packet from the sender to wide range of k. We see that Eg is reasonably high (at least
the receiver as the time shift value. This is reasonable in our 0.6). The reason is that packet cloaking attempts to choose
simulation, because a receiver gets no traffic until it receives receivers in subnets different from the true receiver's sub-
the first packet from the sender. In practice, a more accurate net. As a result, packet traffic similar to that for the true
correlation value may be computed by using more expen- receiver Rr, as generated by the cloaking agent, will have
sive analysis (e.g., finding the average propagation delay a small chance of reaching another receiver in Rr's subnet.
over a fixed period of time). In all our experiments, each Since the correlation values of the sender and the cloaking
reported data point is the average of 10 runs. receivers are high, Pg is low (Equation 4) and Eg is high
(Equation 5).
5.2 Results We also investigate the scenario when no traffic other
than that generated by the cloaking agent is active in the net-
5.2.1 Sender-Receiver Linkability work. We assume that the cloaking agent is lucky enough to
always choose hosts not in the same subnet as Rr. Then, the
We first examine the effect of k on the sender-receiver link- nominator of Equation 4 only contains the correlation value
ability in terms of El. Figure 4 shows that El increases with of the true recipient, yielding a minimal value of Pg and
the value of k. This is because when k increases, the new correspondingly a maximal value of Eg. This "ideal" situa-
participants will receive packets from the sender, thereby tion is shown in Figure 5. We can see that Eg increases with
increasing their correlation values (Equation 1). As a re- k until k = 13. This is because all the k cloaking receivers
sult, the probability of the true receiver being identified, Pr, have the same correlation with the sender, while other non-
participants have a zero correlation. Thus, Equation 4 re- packet cloaking approach based on sending identical pack-
duces to 1. The corresponding value of Eg becomes 1- ets from a sender to a number of cloaking receivers, with
which increases with k (Equation 5). When k > 13, Eg permission by both the sender and the receivers. We pre-
drops, since all the hosts in the subnets other than Rr's have sented the architecture of the proposed system. We also
been chosen as the cloaking receivers, thus forcing the hosts developed two privacy metrics to validate our methods.
in the same subnet as the true receiver R12 (i.e., Ril, R13,
R14 and R15) to be chosen as cloaking receivers (c.f. Fig- Acknowledgments
ure 3). Hence the numerator of Equation 5 increases and Eg
decreases. Note that the difference between the ideal case The work described in this paper was supported by
and the experiments is due to (1) the presence of cross traf- the Internal Coinetitive Research Grants A-PH09 and A-
fic used in the experiments, and (2) the fact that hosts in the
,,, , ~~~~~~~PH39)of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. We would
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